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ABSTRACT

DOES BEING UNAWARE PREDICT BEING UNSKILLED?
ANALYZING THE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF THE METACOGNITION
AWARENESS INVENTORY
by
Daniel A. Scheibe
Spring 2020
Students’ perceptions of how well they know information ultimately impact the
study choices they make. The more accurate these perceptions are, the more prepared
students are to be academically successful. Thus, the current study aimed to find an
efficient way to quickly identify students who struggle with this self-assessment, and
ultimately classroom performance, using a tool designed to assess metacognitive ability.
Participants first completed a metacognition scale designed to assess learning strategies –
the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI). Next, the participants were administered
a 29-minute lecture followed by a brief exam at the end of the lecture. There were three
types of metacognitive judgements used in this study: a) A global predictive judgment, b)
item-by-item confidence judgments, and c) a global postdictive judgment. The exam
results were compared to participants’ self-report on the MAI and participants’
judgements. It was hypothesized that participants with higher MAI scores would do
consistently better on the post-lecture exam than participants with lower MAI scores and
be more accurate with their metacognitive judgments. Additionally, it was hypothesized
that participants in the lowest metacognitive quadrant on the MAI would be
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overconfident in their predictions of exam performance. Neither hypothesis was
supported: The MAI does not appear to be a reliable measure for predicting accuracy of
metacognitive judgments or immediate academic performance.

v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank several contributors for their roles in this project.
Thanks goes to Dr. Danielle Sitzman for her many rigorous edits and comments on this
manuscript, as well as being first chair on this project. Thanks go to Dr. Philip Watkins
and Dr. Jacqueline Coomes for their role as committee members on this project – serving
as second and third chair, respectively.
Additionally, thanks go to research assistants Shelby Madsen and Shaylynn Sapp
who made themselves available to learn the procedure and run participants. This project
would not have been possible if it were not for this team of competent, motivated
individuals providing feedback and support.

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

Page

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………iii
Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………....v
I

Introduction……………………………………………………………………..1

II

Methods………………………………………………………………………..12

III

Results…………………………………………………………………………15

IV

Discussion……………………………………………………………………..25
References……………………………………………………………………..31
Appendixes…………………………………………………………………….37
Vita…………………………………………………………………………….46

Does Being Unaware Predict Being Unskilled?
For over a century now in the U.S. it has been important to pursue academic
success, but now more than ever it is imperative that American higher education finds a
way to turn college freshmen into college graduates. One proposed method for
preventing the spiral that leads to dropping out is to identify students that will struggle as
early as possible and help said students overcome challenges with correctly calibrating
their abilities. While some students may organize their skills and knowledge into
structure, there appears to be little encouragement from instructors to students to develop
this structure (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). For many instructors, helping students at the
individual level with topics like study strategies and organizing students’ skills and
knowledge is not practical due to time constraint and large-scale issues. For that reason,
self-report measures of student awareness and learning are both valuable and practical for
large-scale use in academia (Schellings & Van Hout-Wolters, 2011). The purpose of the
present study is to determine if the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI), a
common metacognitive assessment used in education fields, will be predictive of student
lecture retention ability and metacognitive awareness. It is of particular interest whether
the MAI will be more predictive than other easily accessible student variables such as
grade point average.
Metacognition
Metacognition as a construct has been integrated in the field of cognitive
psychology for the past 40 years (Flavell, 1979). Perhaps most broadly put,
metacognition is an umbrella term referring to cognition about other cognitions, or
thinking about thinking (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Historically, researchers
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distinguish between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control processes.
Metacognitive monitoring involves what one knows about one’s own cognition, and
metacognitive control processes involve how one uses knowledge of one’s own cognition
to regulate cognitive processes and as a by-product, behaviors.
The concepts of metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control processes
appear daily in higher education. In fact, enhancing metacognition is part and parcel of
becoming a better student (Rhodes et al., 2020). Students use cognitive knowledge when
choosing how they will study for an exam, and metacognitive knowledge when they are
deciding if they have studied enough for an exam (Serra & DeMarree, 2016). For
example, if a student glances briefly through her notes and decides that she knows the
material, she might decide that she has studied enough and move on to other endeavors.
That in-the-moment metacognitive judgment of the student’s own learning can be
strongly influential on that student’s test outcome. The more accurately a student can
judge their knowledge, the better use they will make of their time and the more prepared
they will be for exams. We are constantly making judgments about what we know and
do not know and making decisions based on these judgments (Brown et al., 2014).
In order to adequately plan for academic success, students must select appropriate
strategies and allocate appropriate resources that affect performance (Schraw & Graham,
1997). Metacognition has further been related to educational successes and failures
through a relation to the academic locus of control, or the belief that one is able to
perform a task (Arslan & Akin, 2014). Arslan and colleagues found that metacognition is
positively associated with an internal academic locus of control. In other words, the more
metacognitively in-tune students are, the more they tend to believe they control their own
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academic success. Thus, identifying students who struggle to assess their own cognition
- and helping to improve that assessment - should lead to academic benefits.
One often over-looked influence on students’ self-assessment is the students’
instructor (Siedlecka et al., 2018). If an instructor can accurately help students
understand any disparities between what the students know and what they perceive they
know, then the only elements missing for success are motivation and the correct tools to
close the gap. When instructors understand what students know – and what they think
they know – towards the beginning of courses, then the instructors are better prepared to
design instruction in an appropriate way that facilitates learning (Ambrose et al., 2010).
The idea of metacognition, or “knowing what you know”, is a powerful tool when
considering education at all levels. Metacognition directly relates to how individuals
monitor and regulate their cognitive abilities and performances (Schraw & Graham,
1997), and as such it is a crucial component to education. Because metacognition is a
fundamental element of student success, it is important to consider reliable ways to
measure it.
Assessing Metacognition
Metacognition can be measured in a predictive manner or a postdictive manner.
Predictive judgments require people to estimate the likelihood of remembering
information in a future point in time; for example, presenting a student with a topic they
just learned and asking the student to make a judgment of how likely they are to
remember that information on a later test. Postdictive judgments are done after taking an
examination or assessment. These judgments come in various forms and involve the
participant providing a confidence rating in the accuracy of an individual test question or
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retrospective judgment of an overall test score (Callender et al., 2014; Nelson et al.,
2004). The most accurate judgments are the retrospective judgments because there is less
variance in these judgments. Once participants have taken an exam, they have a more
thorough understanding of the variables at play in their judgments, and the judgments
become more accurate. These judgments appear to be more indicative of a general
“monitoring” skill, or metacognitive ability (Schraw et al., 1995). There is a debate in
the literature whether a general metacognitive skill exists of if it is domain-specific skill,
but recent studies support the idea that a general metacognitive skill exists and is one
component of development of higher level cognitive functions (Bellon et al., 2020;
Geurten et al., 2018).
Going a step farther, predictive and postdictive judgements are high-level
cognitive functions that can assess average performance (Global judgments) or
performance on a single item (Relative judgments; Rhodes, 2019). Global (absolute)
judgments assess how well someone can predict their overall performance. For example,
a participant may be asked, “Out of 100 percent possible, what percent correct do you
believe you scored on this test?” Relative (item-by-item) judgments, in contrast, examine
whether the individuals are able to discriminate between the accuracy of specific items
(Rhodes, 2019). For example, a relative judgment might ask, “On a scale of 0% to 100%,
how confident are you that you answered this question correctly?” If participants can
accurately assess their performance, they should provide higher judgments to items they
answer correctly and lower judgments to items they answer incorrectly. Of most interest
in the current study are predictive and postdictive global judgments of exam performance
and item-by-item confidence judgments of specific items on the exam. It is important to
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measure both global and relative judgments because they might be measuring different
metacognitive abilities. Research suggests that people differ greatly not only in
metacognitive ability, but also conceptualization of metacognition (Schraw & Moshman,
1995). Global judgments force participants to provide broad, often challenging
judgments that often lead to lower reliability (Krueger & Mueller, 2002), while item-byitem confidence judgments are much more specific and isolated. Item-by-item
confidence judgments also deal with inherently fewer variables, so they tend to elicit
smaller ranges and better accuracy (Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2013).
It is not surprising that confidence judgments have the interest of cognitive
psychologists, because our cognitions often arise naturally and lead us to make either
well-founded or rash decisions (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). While research has been
fairly widespread on metacognitive judgments since the 1970s, we still do not fully
understand the underlying processes in relationship to education. However, there are
natural disparities between higher performing and lower performing students in
academics and research in the past 20 years indicates that there is may be a robust link
between metacognitive awareness and academic success (i.e., the Dunning-Kruger effect;
Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Serra & DeMarree, 2016).
Dunning-Kruger Effect
The Dunning-Kruger Effect was born from one of the first studies that aimed to
analyze individual differences in metacognitive ability (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). High
performing individuals are often able to accurately distinguish between what they do and
do not know, while low performing individuals struggle to make this distinction. Kruger
and Dunning (1999) suggested a dual burden for the poorest performing participants.
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Incompetent individuals tend to be unaware of their incompetence, thus robbing
themselves of the theoretical opportunity to do something to better their situation.
In a flagship study that developed the Dunning-Kruger Effect, Kruger and
Dunning (1999) conducted four independent studies that tested participants’
metacognition in different ways. Across four separate studies, Kruger and Dunning
(1999) studied metacognitive abilities and performance in multiple domains: Humor,
logical reasoning, grammar, and finally, manipulating competence to see if that improved
metacognitive skills. This series of studies revealed that there is consistently a robust
finding that there is an unskilled and unaware group that is low-performing and exhibits
low metacognitive skills, and paradoxically, the way to make incompetent individuals
realize their own incompetence is to make them competent.
The Dunning-Kruger effect is also robust in a classroom setting. In a study
directly using a classroom context, Hacker and colleagues (2000) addressed the questions
of how accurately students can both predictively and postdictively assess their abilities.
They also asked questions related to accuracy varying over multiple tests. They
examined 99 undergraduate college students enrolled in two sections of an educational
psychology course. A major emphasis of this course was on the very nature of selfassessment. Just prior to exams, students completed an assessment of what percentage of
items they expected to get correct, and immediately following exams students estimated
how they performed on the exam (as measured by total items correct). They were asked
to reflect and analyze why their predictions and postdictions were or were not accurate
and develop an action plan to prepare for the next exam. The lowest performing students
showed strong overconfidence, which become increasingly exacerbated the lower their

7
true score was. In other words, students who performed the worst may have been aware
that they did not do extremely well on the exam, but they were still unable to accurately
pinpoint how poor their performance was. While the high-performing students increased
their predictive and postdictive accuracy throughout the course, the low-performing
students continued to show little predictive accuracy: They remained unaware of their
level of incompetence. This research suggests that the lowest performing students
demonstrated the worst metacognitive predictions and postdictions of their knowledge:
An applied finding supporting the Dunning-Kruger effect in the classroom (Hacker et al.,
2000). This work has been replicated and expanded upon by other studies (Mattern et al.,
2010; Serra & DeMarree, 2016), but to date the literature has not found a successful way
to target this unskilled and unaware group in a quick, reliable way.
The Dunning-Kruger effect demonstrates a clear inability for the lowest
performing students to correctly assess their inadequacies. The lowest performing
students (the unskilled-unaware population) overestimate their performances, while the
highest performing students tend to slightly underestimate their abilities (Mattern et al.,
2010). Although an underestimation could act as a small hinderance to highly skilled
students as they pursue their academic goals, the much more dramatic consequences are
seen in the unskilled-unaware population. The dramatic overestimation of preparedness
for this group serves as a temporary emotional benefit with unfortunate long-term
consequences. In fact, research suggests that the unskilled are motivated to ignore their
poor performance so they can maintain a more blissful emotional state and feel better
about themselves (Kim et al., 2015). This temporary “bliss” is of course not helpful to
these unskilled-unaware students in the long run, and the discrepancy in metacognitive
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ability between high-performing students and low-performing students leads to highperforming students exhibiting more effective test preparation practices, better test
performances, and superior monitoring processes than their counterparts (Filho, 2009).
Thus, being able to effectively identify these students early in a course, before major
exams, may be an important factor in getting students the help and resources they need to
be successful. Because research suggests that the unskilled and unaware are resistant to
becoming accurate with their predictions (Hacker et al., 2000), it would be highly
valuable for instructors to have a quick, easy way to identify these students early in a
course.
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
Often researchers look at the term “metacognition” with specific assessments of
information (e.g., tests for a course), but some researchers have attempted to create more
general inventories to assess a broader perspective of metacognition (Brown, 1987;
Schraw & Moshman, 1995). The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) is a
metacognitive self-assessment tool specifically related to student learning and study
strategies (Brown, 1987). The MAI was developed in educational psychology as a tool to
assess students’ techniques, increase awareness of poor strategies, and facilitate
appropriate study strategies. Because the MAI is the only inventory to date that deals
exclusively with student study strategies (Harrison & Vallin, 2017), it is of particular
interest whether the simple inventory can yield meaningful information about students’
metacognitive abilities as a predictor of performance. It is presently unclear whether
metacognitive scales developed in education map onto metacognitive accuracy as defined
in cognitive psychology, but if they do, this may be a good way for teachers to detect
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students who will struggle at a preliminary level. The present study uses a widely
accepted metacognitive inventory designed specifically to monitor learning strategies.
The MAI was the first reliable measure for assessing metacognition through selfreport methodology (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). This scale taps the traditional theories
of metacognition that consider knowledge of cognition (or metacognitive monitoring) and
regulation of cognition based on this knowledge (or metacognitive control). The MAI
consists of 52 true or false questions. Each question is an “I” statement for the
participant, and the participants must decide if that statement applies to them (true) or
does not apply to them (false). There are no reverse-scored items on the MAI, meaning
that a score of 52 would be a “perfect score” and the student would be self-reporting
perfect study strategies and metacognition. If students are accurately self-reporting their
study strategies and metacognition, then a higher score on the MAI equates to being more
metacognitively aware. MAI scores get coded into two main categories: Knowledge
about cognition (metacognitive monitoring), and regulation of cognition (metacognitive
control). An example question about knowledge of cognition is, “I know what the
teacher expects me to learn.” An example question addressing regulation of cognition is,
“I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.”
Knowledge of cognition further divides up into the three commonly considered
subsets of metacognitive knowledge: Declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and
conditional knowledge (Schraw & Graham, 1997; Schraw & Moshman, 1995).
Declarative knowledge is the factual knowledge the learner needs before being able to
use critical thinking. Procedural knowledge is the application of the declarative
knowledge. Conditional knowledge is the application of declarative knowledge and
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procedural knowledge under different circumstances where specific processes or skills
should transfer (Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Regulation of
cognition divides into five categories: Planning, information management strategies,
comprehension monitoring, debugging strategies, and evaluation. Planning is goal
setting and allocating resources prior to learning. Information management strategies are
skills and strategy sequences used to process information more efficiently.
Comprehension monitoring is assessment of one’s learning or strategy use. Debugging
strategies are used to corrected comprehension issues and performance errors. Evaluation
is the analysis of performance and strategy effectiveness after a learning episode (Schraw
& Dennison, 1994; Schraw & Moshman, 1995).
It is yet uncertain whether this type of self-report scale and a general measure of
academic metacognitive ability can predict performance in the classroom. Theoretically,
if students score higher on the MAI (indicating higher levels of self-awareness), then they
should be able to perform better on academic assessments and more accurately predict
how well they will perform. The MAI is a simple tool and easy to administer: If it has
predictive qualities related to student performance, then there are several implications for
education. First, instructors have an easy tool to decipher which students may initially
need more help in their classroom and can provide these students with the materials and
resources to be successful. Second, the MAI would be an easy way for students to
evaluate their own study strategies and provide students with a reality check to their
perceived abilities compared to their actual abilities. Third, from only one class session,
or even a pre-class survey, instructors already have a way to judge their students’ ability.
Understanding what students know coming into courses allows instructors to more

11
efficiently design their coursework and be effective catalysts facilitating student learning
(Ambrose et al., 2010).
The Present Study
Several studies show that there is a strong correlation between metacognitive
ability and success in learning outcome studies (Callender et al., 2016; Filho, 2009;
Rhodes et al, 2020; Schraw et al., 1995; Serra & DeMarree, 2016). Additionally, other
studies have shown that metacognitive inventories (such as the MAI) are a reliable way to
predict metacognitive abilities (Pedone et al., 2017; Schraw & Dennison, 1997; Semerari
et al., 2012). The question of the current study is: Can the MAI reliably predict which
individuals will be higher performing and lower performing in terms of both
metacognitive ability and testing lecture retention? If the answer to this question is yes,
then the applications for education are substantial. Instructors could quickly and easily
identify students that are likely to struggle the most in the course in a matter of 20
minutes (Reid et al., 2017).
The current study examined how the MAI related to both objective and subjective
(metacognitive) performance on an exam. After completing the MAI, participants
watched a video lecture and took a test over the material in the lecture. Prior to the exam,
students made broad predictions about how well they thought they would perform. On
the exam, participants answered multiple choice questions and rated their confidence in
the accuracy of their response. Finally, at the end of the exam, students were asked to
provide a general postdictive assessment of their absolute score on the exam.
There are two hypotheses for this study. First, it is expected that individuals who
score higher on the MAI will do better on the lecture test than individuals that score
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lower on the MAI. Second, it is predicted that individuals in the lowest quadrant of the
MAI will be less metacognitively accurate as exhibited by being less accurate with (a)
their overall predictive judgments, (b) their individual item-by-item confidence
judgments and (c) their overall postdictive absolute judgment on the exam.
Method
Participants
A total of 49 students from Eastern Washington University, a mid-size public
university in the Pacific Northwest, participated in the study. The age range of
participants in this study was 18-27 (M = 20.63, SD = 3.76). Participants were primarily
female (n = 41). All students participated for partial course credit in undergraduate
psychology classes at EWU. This study adhered to all the ethical principles and was
approved by the Institutional Review Board. No specifically identifying information was
collected, and student responses were coded such that they were kept confidential and
anonymous.
Materials
Metacognitive Inventory
The primary purpose of this study is to draw conclusions about the Metacognitive
Awareness Inventory related to education. The MAI consists of 52 true/false “I”
statements like, “I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use,” and, “I think of
several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one” that load onto eight subcategories (See Appendix 1). Each of the eight sub-categories has between 4 and 10 items
for coding after the participant completes the 52-item inventory. This system of
evaluating metacognitive abilities goes a step farther than just labeling participants with
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an umbrella “metacognitive score.” Two data-check items were added into the MAI to
make sure that participants were paying attention to the MAI questions.
Video Lecture
The lecture used in this study was a 29-minute video lecture on the topic of
marine biology. Specifically, the lecture discussed the topic of Arctic and Antarctic
environments, which was a singular lecture in a larger lecture series through The Great
Courses Plus. (Todd, 2010). The lecture was used with consent from The Great Courses
Plus for academic purposes.

Prior to taking the lecture, participants were given a survey

to assess a) their major, b) the extent – if any - of classes they have taken in biology, and
c) on a 9-point Likert scale how much knowledge they have of specifically marine
biology. This topic was chosen specifically because it is unlikely that the participants in
this study have been exposed to much marine biology.
Post-Lecture Assessment
Participants were asked to evaluate their performance in three different ways.
They were asked (a) a one-question global predictive assessment of how well they think
they will do on the exam, (b) individual item-by-item confidence judgments for each
question on the test, and (c) a one-question global postdictive assessment of how well
they did on the exam.
The global predictive assessment stated, “You are about to be tested on the
material you learned. The test will consist of only multiple-choice questions. On a scale
of 0-100, with 0 meaning 0% of questions answered correctly and 100 being 100% of
questions answered correctly, how well do you think you will do on that test?” The
assessment consisted of 25 multiple-choice questions about material from the video
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lecture (See Appendix 2). Questions were across many different sub-topics and covered
material addressed throughout the 29-minute lecture. Example questions are, “Which
word is assigned to krill by the lecturer to denote krill’s significance to their ecosystem,”
and “Approximately what percentage of earth’s ice is in Antarctica?” Each question had
four possible answers. Each question had two components: a) The question itself and b)
a confidence judgment which participants completed after they provided an answer to the
question. The confidence prompt was, “On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100%
(absolutely certain), how confident are you in the accuracy of your answer to this
question?” At the end of the exam, the global postdictive assessment stated, “Now that
you have completed the multiple-choice exam, please re-visit the question you were
asked before the exam. On a scale of 0-100, with 0 meaning 0% of questions answered
correctly and 100 meaning 100% of questions answered correctly, how well do you think
you did on the test?” Finally, there was a brief demographic survey at the end of the
packet collecting information, class standing, high school grade point average, and
college grade point average.
Procedure
This study was conducted in a small classroom with groups of 1-10 participants.
Participants read through consent forms, and then completed the first packet which
included the MAI and the marine biology knowledge 3-question survey. Once all the
participants in the group completed the first packet, the research assistant provided
participants with materials for which to take notes and informed the participants that
although taking notes is optional, it is encouraged. Then the research assistant played the
29-minute video lecture. At the end of the video lecture, the participants’ notes were
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collected, and the second packet was handed out. The second packet included the onequestion global predictive question, the 25-item test (paired with item-by-item confidence
judgments), the global postdictive question, and the demographic questionnaire.
Participants were instructed to complete each section of the packet before proceeding to
the next section. Upon completion of the second packet, participants were thanked for
their time and free to leave. The study lasted for an average of approximately 55-60
minutes.
Results
The present student looked at the MAI as a predictor of exam scores and accuracy
of metacognitive judgments. The first section analyzes basic performance on exam
scores, metacognitive judgments, and MAI scores. Following this, the two main
hypotheses for the study are analyzed and discussed .
Basic Performance
Exam Scores
The average exam score was 59.67% (SE = 2.01%) and scores ranged from 36%
to 92%. The exam was 25 multiple choice questions: Each question had four possible
answers. Therefore, random chance would be a score of 25.00% on the exam. A onesample t-test was run which showed that participants performed significantly better than
chance on the exam, t(48) = 17.25, p < .001. There were no questions that 100% of
participants answered correctly (91.8% of participants correctly answered the easiest
question) and there were no questions that 0% of participants answered correctly (16.3%
of participants correctly answered the hardest question).
Global Judgments
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Prior to taking the exam, participants were prompted to predict their performance
on the exam on a scale of 0% to 100%. The average predicted score was 56.74% (SE =
2.61%) with a wide range: Participants predicted they would score from 0% to 90% on
the exam. Two participants incorrectly provided a range prediction instead of a specific
score. Thus, the average of that range was used for their prediction (i.e. a prediction of
40%-60% would be scored as a prediction of 50%). Three participants did not provide
predictive confidence judgments. After the exam, participants responded to the same
question, but now as a postdictive judgment with the added benefit of fully knowing what
they were being asked to evaluate. The average postdictive judgment was 59.18 (SE =
3.28%), with nearly the same, wide range as the predictive judgments: 10% to 90%. A
paired sample t-test was run which revealed that there were not significant differences
between predictive and postdictive judgments at the participant level, t(44)= -1.14, p =
.259.
Metacognitive Accuracy
The accuracy of metacognitive judgements was explored by examining both the
precision of global predictive/postdictive judgments and item-by-item confidence
judgments. In accordance with previous literature, Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations
(γ) were used to correlate judgments with performance. This non-parametric correlation
assumes judgments are ordinal as opposed to having scale properties (Rhodes, 2019).
Similar to regular Pearson “r” correlation values, gammas range between -1.00 and 1.00.
A higher gamma correlation suggests a stronger correlation between the two variables
(i.e. a γ of .75 suggests a much stronger relationship between two variables than a γ of
.20). For the sake of the present study, higher gamma values – gammas closer to 1.00 –
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represent more accurate judgments (i.e., higher judgments for items answered correctly
and lower judgments to items answered incorrectly, or more accurate global judgments).
Relative Accuracy
Calculating a gamma correlation – between item-by-item confidence judgments
and accuracy of a response - can control for participants using judgment scales in
different ways. For example, one participant might provide a 75% confidence judgment
and another participant might provide a 95% confidence judgment, when both
participants are trying to relay the same level of confidence. Gamma correlations control
for the differences in the subjectivity of these judgments.
A gamma correlation between item-by-item confidence judgements and accuracy
of a response (scored as 0 for incorrect and 1 for correct) was calculated for each
participant, and then averaged across all participants. Overall, there was a significant
correlation (γ =.49, SE = .04), t(48) = 17.25, p <.001, indicating that, on average,
participants fairly accurately discriminated between correct and incorrect answers on the
exam. However, there was also a wide range in correlations (-.36 to .94) suggesting that
some participants were better able to predict their performance than others (to be further
discussed in the Dunning-Kruger effect section).
Absolute Accuracy
In addition to item-by-item judgments, participants also made global predictive
and postdictive judgments. The accuracy of these judgments was measured by
comparing the differences between predictive judgments and exam scores. For example,
if a participant predicted they would score 50% , but they actually scored 80%, then the
difference would be 30%. A positive difference score (i.e. +30%) represents under-
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confidence; a negative difference score (i.e. -30%) represents over-confidence. As seen
in Figure 1, participants’ predictive judgments before the exam correlated strongly with
their postdictive judgments after the exam, γ =.69, p < .001. This suggests a trend of
participants having a fairly stable evaluation of their test performance, both before and
after the exam. A gamma correlation was run between participants’ predicted exam
scores and true exam scores, which did not reveal a significant correlation, γ = .21, p =
.140. However, there was a significant positive correlation between participants’
postdicted exam scores and true exam scores , γ = .39, p < .001. Thus, after completing
the exam, participants were better able to predict their performance than they were prior
to the exam.
The Dunning-Kruger Effect
In order to replicate the Dunning-Kruger effect in a way consistent with the
literature, a quartile split was done by exam scores (Hacker, 2000; Kruger & Dunning,
1999; Serra & DeMarree, 2016). The highest performing participants on the exam (the
top quartile) should have more accurate global predictions compared to the lowest
performing participants on the exam (the bottom quartile). Additionally, to replicate the
Dunning-Kruger effect, the top quartile of participants should underestimate their exam
performance (positive difference scores), while the bottom quartile of participants should
overestimate their exam performance (negative difference scores).
The difference scores between predictive judgments and actual exam scores were
tested against zero for both participants in the top quartile and participants in the bottom
quartile. Overall, participants in the bottom quartile significantly overestimated their
performance (M = -16.60, SE = 4.40), t(9) = -3.77, p = .004, while participants in the top
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quartile significantly underestimated their exam performance (M =15.53, SE = 5.38),
t(12)= 2.89, p = .014. These scores were significantly different from one another, t(21)= 4.43, p < .001.
The same set of analyses were run on difference scores between postdictive
judgments and exam scores. Although participants in the bottom quartile continued to
significantly overestimate their exam performance (M = -11.71, SE = 5.26), t(11)= -2.23,
p = .048, participants in the top quartile accurately predicted their performance and were
not significantly underconfident (M = 3.77, SE = 3.81), t(12)= .99, p = .343. These scores
were significantly different from one another, t(23)= -2.41, p = .024.
As seen in Figure 1, the data from the present study replicated the DunningKrueger effect in that the bottom quartile (on exam scores) exhibited overconfidence of
their scores for both predictions and postdictions while the top quartile (on exam scores)
exhibited initial under-confidence, but after taking the exam these participants were able
to accurately judge their performance.
In addition to global predictive judgment and global postdictive judgments, the
item-by-item confidence by accuracy relationships were examined to see if there were
differences between the top quartile and bottom quartile (of exam scores) An
independent samples was approaching significance to suggest that perhaps the gamma
correlations – between item accuracy and item confidence judgments – were more
accurate for the top quartile (M = .57, SE = .06) compared to the bottom quartile (M =
.34, SE = .09), t(24)= -2.03, p = .054. Participants who performed best on the exam may
be better able to accurately distinguish between correct and incorrect responses on the
final exam than low performing participants.
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Figure 1
Quartile-split exam scores compared to predictive and postdictive judgments

Note. Error bars show standard errors.
MAI Results
The primary goal of the present study centers on questions related to the MAI and
its potential predictive abilities. A higher numerical score on the MAI equates to a higher
self-reported metacognitive awareness, with the highest possible score of 52. Participants
self-reported an average score of 36.76 (scores ranged from 24-49, SE = .95). This study
examined whether the MAI is predictive of a) exam performance and b) metacognitive
ability. Quartile splits were done based on MAI scores to attempt to reveal any predictive
qualities the MAI might have when comparing the highest and lowest MAI self-reported
scores (See Table 1).
Quartile splits have the potential to bring to light effects that can be lost in
standard correlation and regression models. The bottom quartile of the MAI (n = 12)
averaged a score of 28.50 (SE = .68), the second quartile of the MAI (n =12) averaged a
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score of 33.92 (SE = .43), the third quartile of the MAI (n = 13) averaged a score of
38.62 (SE = .33), and the top quartile of the MAI (n =12) averaged a score of 45.83 (SE =
.64). For a full breakdown of how the different self-reported quartiles performed on
exam scores, global predictions, item-by-item accuracy of confidence judgments, and
global postdictions, see Table 1.
Table 1
Comparing MAI quartiles for metacognitive predictions, accuracy, and exam scores.

Exam Score

Pre-Exam
Prediction

Item Accuracy
by Confidence
Gamma

Post-Exam
Prediction

12

58.67% (4.16%)

53.75% (6.63%)

.63 (.06)

53.58% (6.77%)

2nd
Quartile

12

66.00% (3.50%)

56.25% (4.85%)

.49 (.08)

55.67% (6.93%)

3rd
Quartile

13

56.62% (3.32%)

57.55% (4.22%)

.38 (.08)

63.92% (6.22%)

Top
Quartile

12

57.67% (4.93%)

59.73% (5.19%)

.49 (.09)

63.54% (6.56%)

Sample
Size
Bottom
Quartile

Note. Standard errors of the mean are provided in parentheses.
Hypothesis 1: Exam Scores and the MAI
It was hypothesized that participants who self-reported higher scores on the MAI
would also score higher on the exam. To support the first hypothesis, the results would
have to show a predictive ability of the MAI regarding exam scores. If this hypothesis is
accurate, there should be a clear relationship between MAI scores and exam scores, such
that in general higher MAI scores would predict higher exam scores, and lower MAI
scores would predict lower exam scores. Quartile splits were done to specifically analyze

22
the group of participants which were hypothesized to be the unskilled and unaware (the
bottom quartile on the MAI).
A regression analysis indicated that scores on the MAI did not significantly
predict scores on the post-lecture exam, β = -.10, t(47) = -.64, p =.525. Additionally, the
highest self-reported scores on the MAI (n =12) were compared to the lowest selfreported scores on the MAI (n =12). An independent two-sample t-test revealed no
difference in exam scores – as seen in Table 1 - between the top MAI quartile and the
bottom MAI quartile, t(22)= .72, p = .878. Holistically, these results suggest that
participants who self-reported higher scores on the MAI did not perform better on the
exam than participants who self-reported lower scores on the MAI.
Hypothesis 2: Metacognitive accuracy and the MAI
The second hypothesis was that participants in the highest self-reported quadrant
of the MAI would be significantly more accurate on their metacognitive judgments
compared to the participants in the lowest self-reported quadrant of the MAI. To support
the second hypothesis, the results would have to show a predictive ability of the MAI
regarding accuracy of metacognitive judgments. This hypothesis was tested with global
predictive and postdictive judgments, and item-by-item relationships between item
accuracy and confidence. Quartile splits were done again to try and illuminate any
differences between the highest and lowest MAI scores.
Global Predictive Judgments
Global predictive judgments were provided after watching the lecture but prior
to taking the exam. For this facet of the second hypothesis to be true, higher scores on
the MAI should predict more accurate global predictive judgments. It was hypothesized
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that these differences would be lower for participants with higher self-reported MAI
scores, and that that the participants in the highest quadrant of MAI scores would show
under-confidence while the participants in the lowest quadrant of MAI scores would
show over-confidence.
A simple regression was run to test the MAI’s predictive ability for the accuracy
of global predictive judgments. Overall scores on the MAI did not predict the accuracy
of global predictive judgments compared to true exam scores, β = .15, t(45) = .97, p =
.336. A two-sample t-test was run to compare the top and bottom quartiles on the MAI:
This test found no difference between the top quartile on the MAI (M = -.82, SE = 6.98)
and the bottom quartile on the MAI (M = 4.92, SE = 6.43) on the average differences
between predictive judgments and true exam scores, t(21)= .61, p = .551. These results
suggest no relationship between MAI scores and accuracy of global predictive judgments.
Global Postdictive Judgments
Another simple regression was run to evaluate if MAI scores predicted the
accuracy of global postdictive judgments. These judgments were provided after both
watching the lecture and completing the post-lecture exam. For this facet of the second
hypothesis to be true, higher scores on the MAI should predict more accurate global
postdictive judgments. Similar to the global predictive accuracy, the global postdictive
accuracy was measured by comparing the absolute value of the differences between
postdictive judgments and exam scores.
A simple regression was run to test the MAI’s predictive ability for the accuracy
of global postdictive judgments. Overall scores on the MAI did not predict the accuracy
of global postdictive judgments compared to true exam scores, β = .21, t(47) = 1.44, p =
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.156. A two-sample t-test was run to compare the top and bottom quartiles on the MAI:
This test found no difference between the top quartile on the MAI (M = -5.88, SE = 6.08)
and the bottom quartile on the MAI (M = 5.08, SE = 5.08) on the average differences
between postdictive judgments and true exam scores, t(22)= 1.38, p = .180. These results
suggest no relationship between MAI scores and accuracy of global postdictive
judgments.
Item-By-Item Accuracy
A simple regression was run to assess if MAI scores predict gamma correlations
between item accuracy and confidence judgments. It was hypothesized that participants
with higher MAI scores would demonstrate more metacognitive accuracy (as indicated
by stronger gamma correlations). Overall scores on the MAI did not significantly predict
gamma correlations between item accuracy and item confidence, β = -.21, t(47) = -1.41, p
=.164.
An independent-sample t-test was run comparing the bottom quartile on the MAI
and the top quartile on the MAI for average gamma correlations between item-by-item
confidence and item accuracy. This test did not indicate a significant difference between
the top and bottom quartiles on the MAI, but the difference was trending towards
significance, t(22)=1.20, p = .089. However – in contrast to what this study proposed the bottom quartile on the MAI outperformed the top quartile on the MAI in terms of
accuracy (see Table 1 for a full comparison by quartiles). In summary, none of the
hypotheses related to the MAI were confirmed: There were no statistically significant
findings about significant relationships between the MAI and global predictive
judgments, item-by-item gamma correlations, or global postdictive judgments.
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Discussion
The present study aimed to assess whether the MAI – a metacognitive selfassessment measure commonly used in education contexts – can predict performance and
metacognitive accuracy on an educationally-relevant task. It was hypothesized that
higher scores on the MAI would predict a) higher post-lecture exam scores, b) more
accurate pre-lecture confidence judgements, c) more accurate post-lecture confidence
judgments, and d) more accurate item-by-item confidence judgements. Data did not
support these hypotheses, which suggests that the MAI – in its original 52-question true
or false form – may not be predictive of student learning or the accuracy of student
confidence judgments. If the MAI is supposed to be a measure of metacognitive
awareness, and metacognitive awareness is an essential component of being a good
student (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Rhodes, 2020; Soderstrom et al., 2016), then why
was there no relationship between any of the aforementioned variables?
There are several possible reasons which range from the nature of self-report to
the MAI itself. First, self-report measures often have threats to validity (Boekaerts &
Corno, 2005; Cromley & Azevedo, 2006). It is challenging for many participants to
assess their strengths and weaknesses; there are often extraneous factors – like mood and
recent events – that influence participants’ responses (Nelson, 1984; Winne & Perry,
2005). Using a self-report measure on the topic of metacognition is inherently even more
challenging: Participants are required not just to articulate how well they know something
(i.e. how well they know facts about United States history) but they must perform a
higher-level cognitive process evaluating their own cognitions (i.e. they must report
whether they know how well they did on an exam). This higher-level self-assessment

26
could be inherently challenging and perceived differently across participants.
Specifically, lower-performing students might especially struggle with self-evaluations,
further compromising a self-report study designed to target this population (Krueger &
Dunning, 1999).
Even though self-report has challenges, according to a review done by Dinsmore
et al. (2008) , self-report is still the second-most-used method to collect information
about metacognition. Because the literature widely reinforces the use of self-report when
studying metacognition, self-report alone is likely not the sole factor leading to rejecting
the hypotheses of the present study. Another possible explanation for the lack of
relationship between MAI scores and other variables is due to the method of response
employed in the MAI. True or false options alone can be interpreted differently by
different students (Winne & Perry, 2005) and these answer options also often do not
encompass a wide enough range of specific options for participants (Tourangeau et al.,
2000). For example, participants may not believe that a statement is fully true for them,
but when only presented with polarizing options – true or false – they are forced to make
a choice that may not accurately represent their true opinion.
Because of this response range issue, the MAI has been re-structured in some
studies to try and draw out relationships (Coutinho, 2007; Young & Fry, 2008). One
method that provides a wider range is to use a scale ranging from one through five paired
with phrasing about how applicable the concept or habit is to the participants, (Harrison
& Vallin, 2017). For example, the first question on the MAI states, “I ask myself
periodically if I am meeting my goals” (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Instead of
participants evaluating an all-or-nothing true or false evaluation, they would instead have
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the option of choosing five options ranging from, “Always true for me,” to “Always false
for me.” These expansions on the MAI take the original inventory a step farther to try
and pull useful information, but to date there is still little evidence that the MAI is an
effective empirical tool for drawing conclusions and making predictions.
Because this study replicated the robust finding of the Dunning-Kruger effect –
even though this study was highly underpowered – this study expands on previous
literature to provide more support for the Dunning-Kruger effect. The Dunning-Kruger
effect was still present in this study despite both a) too small of a sample size and b) a
restricted range. The postdictive judgments are perhaps the best test of the DunningKruger effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Hacker, 2000; Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2014), so
the ability of the top quartile of participants to calibrate their postdictions after the exam
while the participants in the bottom quartile still remained overconfident in their
postdictions replicates the Dunning-Krueger effect.
Other researchers argued that when examining confidence judgments, unskilledunaware participants exhibit lower confidence than their peers (even though they are still
overconfident of their own performance), so naturally it appears that they are somewhat
aware of their incompetence (Handel & Fritzsche, 2015). Still others have argued that all
individuals, whether skilled or unskilled, are likely to struggle to correctly calibrate their
metacognitive judgments due to a fairly universal lack of insight (Burson et al., 2006).
However, after further research and statistical control for the above concerns with the
Dunning-Kruger effect, some argue that the dramatic miscalibration by the lowestperforming students is still present (Handel & Dresel, 2018; Kruger & Dunning, 2002;
Sheldon et al., 2015). This effect holds across a variety of arenas; the three different
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arenas in the original study (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) and emotional intelligence
(Sheldon, et al., 2015) just to name a few. For that reason, the replication of the
Dunning-Kruger effect in this study seems consistent with the literature.
Limitations
There were several limitations to the present study, both within the parameters of
the study and also due to unforeseen challenges affecting many institutions of higher
education. The most glaring limitation to the study is the small sample size (n=49). Due
to the nature of the study and the aim to compare participants within a quartile split, the
ideal number of participants for this study would have been a minimum of 120.
However, the study was run just pre-dating the outbreak of COVID-19. It was not
possible to continue collecting participants due to the international pandemic, and
research participation had to be halted at 49. Because of the small sample size, questions
linger about whether there might be different findings with a larger sample. Given the
fact that there were some trends towards significance (i.e. the relationship between itemby-item gamma correlations and MAI scores), it is feasible that more significant
relationships might have appeared with a larger sample. COVID-19 also made the
analysis and presentation of these data more challenging. With universities going online
and in-person contact being mostly if not wholly prohibited, interpreting the data from
the present study had to be done primarily in isolation: A process not typical of data in
the social sciences.
Another limitation of this study is that the original 52-item true or false version of
the MAI was chosen as the primary measure of interest. There have been other studies
that may have more practical variations of the MAI (Magno, 2008, 2010; Young & Fry,
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2008) – including different scoring options and reverse-scoring questions - which may
have been more appropriate for the present study as well. Most recently, Harrison and
Vallin (2017) proposed a 19-item version of the MAI through confirmatory factor
analysis. Other proposals for scoring the original 52-item version have also been
proposed (Hughs, 2015; Youngs & Fry, 2008). Building on one of these previous studies
– for example, trying the 19-question version of the MAI proposed by Harrison and
Vallin (2017) - may have elicited trends that provide valuable information.
One final limitation is that the MAI could potentially be tapping a more global
metacognitive ability that does not necessarily apply to specific situations very well.
Participants in the present study were not tracked across multiple classes or even multiple
sessions; they only experience a one-hour session for the entire study. Given the small
scope of the study, it is possible that there may be different findings in a multi-session
study or a classroom study. Studies operating under these parameters elicited strong
Dunning-Kruger effects (Hacker et al, 2000; Serra & DeMarree, 2016) and had strong
metacognitive components. Comparing some of these more longitudinal elements with
the MAI may have been a better way to assess what (if anything) the MAI can predict.
Future Directions
Although there are clear limitations with the present study, there are a few
interesting takeaways as well. Primarily, these data build on previous data in suggesting
that the original 52-question true or false version of the MAI likely does not have
predictive abilities for student retention or accuracy of confidence judgments (Harrison &
Vallin, 2017). However, there still may be a potential for tweaking current educational
metacognitive inventories - like the MAI, the Motivated Strategies for Learning
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Questionnaire or MSLQ (Pintrich & de Groot, 1990), and the Learning and Study
Strategies Inventory or LASSI (Weinstein et al., 1987) – or developing a new inventory
to act as an educational tool helping students monitor learning and instructors shape their
courses. Future research should investigate various options of these inventories to see if
there are valid, reliable forms of these assessments. It is currently an open question
whether there is a metacognitive skill that can be tapped in education or metacognition is
a domain-specific construct. Further studies should aim to continue to investigate this
question.
Conclusion
This study provided an opportunity for a simple, easy to administer tool from
educational psychology to be tested for its merits and implications as a tool to be used in
post-secondary education. The results of the present study were largely underwhelming
due to a myriad of factors, but these data suggest that the MAI is likely not a reliable tool
for instructors. While it is important for instructors to gauge their students’ learning
(Ambrose et al., 2010), these data suggest that the MAI is probably not the best way to
quantify student’s study strategies and metacognitive abilities. There is simply too much
variability in MAI scores, perception of true and false questions, and ability of students to
accurately assess their ability to self-assess that the MAI leads to too much variance to
draw conclusions or predictions. Until there is a simpler, reliable, valid version of the
MAI (or a similar measure), instructors in post-secondary education should turn to other
methods to gauge their students’ abilities.
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Appendixes
Appendix 1
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Modified for this study)
MAI
The following questions address your habits related to your learning strategies and
processes. Specially, please address these questions in an educational framework. Please
answer true or false as appropriate. Please try and answer as truthfully as possible.
True False
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals.
I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer.
I try to use strategies that have worked in the past.
I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time.
I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.
I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task.
I know how well I did once I finish a test.
I set specific goals before I begin a task.
I slow down when I encounter important information.
I know what kind of information is most important to learn.
I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a
problem.
I am good at organizing information.
I consciously focus my attention on important information.
I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use.
I learn best when I know something about the topic.
I know what the teacher expects me to learn.
I am paying attention and am answering these questions accurately.
I am good at remembering information.
I use different learning strategies depending on the situation.
I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a
task.
I have control over how well I learn.
I periodically review to help me understand important relationships.
I ask myself questions about the material before I begin.
I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.
I summarize what I’ve learned after I finish.
I ask others for help when I don’t understand something.
I can motivate myself to learn when I need to.
I am aware of what strategies I use when I study.
I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study.
I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.
I focus on the meaning and significance of new information.
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32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

I create my own examples to make information more meaningful.
I am a good judge of how well I understand something.
I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically.
I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.
I know when each strategy I use will be most effective.
I ask myself how well I accomplish my goals once I’m finished.
I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning.
I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem.
I try to translate new information into my own words.
I have stopped paying attention and no longer am answering
accurately.
I change strategies when I fail to understand.
I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn.
I read instructions carefully before I begin a task.
I ask myself if what I’m reading is related to what I already know.
I re-evaluate my assumptions when I get confused.
I organize my time to best accomplish my goals.
I learn more when I am interested in the topic.
I try to break studying down into smaller steps.
I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics.
I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am
learning something new.
I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a
task.
I stop and go back over new information that is not clear.
I stop and reread when I get confused.
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Appendix 2
The 25-Question Exam
Post-Lecture Exam
After taking the test on the lecture material, please answer the following question to the
best of your ability.
1. What term relates to photosynthetic and chemosynthetic activity of primary
producers?
a. Productivity
b. Luciferescence
c. Selectivity
d. Chlorophyll A
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
2. What is another name for “The Polar Front?”
a. The Antarctic Convergence
b. The Artic Convergence
c. The Sub-Antarctic Surface
d. The Arctic Surface
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
3. Which word is assigned to krill by the lecturer to denote krill’s significance to their
ecosystem?
a. Keystone species
b. Apex species
c. Vital species
d. Fundamental species
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
4. What is the term referring to the process of an organism using their own light to
navigate and function?
a. Luciferescence
b. Photosynthesis
c. Bioluminescence
d. Chemosynthesis
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On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
_______
5. What is the length of an average krill?
a. 1-2 cm long
b. 3-4 cm long
c. 5-6 cm long
d. 7-8 cm long
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
6. What is the name of the bluff which was named for two ruined expeditions re-uniting
which the lecturer talks about in the first part of the lecture?
a. Cape Hope
b. Cape Larson
c. Cape Reunion
d. Cape Well-Met
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
7. Most of our current fisheries are ______ and _______.
a. Open water; temperate
b. Open water; extreme
c. Shelf-based; temperate
d. Shelf-based; extreme
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
8. Which of the following is true of krill?
a. They are herbivores
b. They are carnivores
c. They are omnivores
d. Their diet is mostly unknown to researchers
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
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________
9. In addition to leopard seals, what other species does the lecturer refer to as the natural
predators of the Antarctic region?
a. Emperor Penguins
b. Great White Sharks
c. Blue Whales
d. Killer Whales
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
10. Chemosynthesis is a process that occurs entirely in the domain of:
a. Air
b. Light
c. Water
d. Bacteria
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
11. How is productivity measured?
a. Grams of Hydrogen per meters squared per year
b. Grams of Carbon per meters squared per year
c. Grams of Mercury per meters squared per year
d. Grams of Oxygen per meters squared per year
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
12. Which ecosystem that accounts for roughly 50% of the earth’s surface does the
lecturer state we know very little about?
a. Abyssal Plane
b. Antarctic Shelf
c. Sub-Antarctic Trench
d. Abyssal Trench
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
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13. What is the name of the lecturer from the video you watched?
a. Dr. Sean Todd
b. Dr. Carl Larson
c. Dr. Todd Larson
d. Dr. Gary Cousins
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
14. What is the name of the group of predators that luminate their hunting light to a color
that is invisible to their own predators?
a. Glowfish
b. Patagonian Toothfish
c. Lightfish
d. Dragonfish
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
15. Approximately what percentage of earth’s ice is in Antarctica?
a. 70%
b. 75%
c. 90%
d. 95%
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
16. What important international treaty was signed in 1946 according to the lecture?
a. The International Convention for Antarctic Wildlife
b. The International Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Wildlife
c. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
d. The International Convention of Whaling Regulations
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
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17. What is the reason cited in lecture that there is generally more productivity in shallow
areas than deeper areas?
a. Shallow areas have a more diverse animal population
b. Shallow areas have a less diverse animal population
c. Photosynthesis is linked to light availability, which is best in spring and
summer
d. Mixing processes in shallow areas allows nutrients to come to the surface
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
18. What does the lecturer refer to as “the last frontier on our planet?”
a. Space
b. The oceans
c. Antarctica
d. Knowledge about Antarctic ecosystems
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
19. What is the approximate surface area of Antarctica?
a. 13 million kilometers squared
b. 23 million kilometers squared
c. 33 million kilometers squared
d. 53 million kilometers squared
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
20. Which of the following types of animals was not discussed in lecture as being a
predator of krill?
a. Seabirds
b. Whales
c. Seals
d. Sharks
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
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21. How is most of Antarctica as a geographic region classified?
a. A glacier
b. An ice sheet
c. A wasteland
d. A desert
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
22. What is the best way to tell if you have crossed the polar front?
a. The water changes from green to blue
b. The water changes from blue to green
c. There are markers in the water that denote the edges of the front
d. The temperature of the water changes
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
23. How is productivity affected as one moves away from the equator - outside 40
degrees north and south of the equator?
a. Productivity dramatically increases
b. Productivity slightly decreases
c. Productivity dramatically decreases
d. There is no noticeable change in productivity at these cutoffs
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
24. What is the market name of the Patagonian Toothfish?
a. Antarctic Sea Bass
b. Chilean Sea Bass
c. Patagonian Sea Tuna
d. Southwestern Sea Tuna
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
________
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25. Because of the absence of light, productivity in the abyssal plane must be:
a. Chemosynthetic
b. Photosynthetic
c. Both chemosynthetic and photosynthetic
d. Neither chemosynthetic nor photosynthetic
On a scale of 25% (random chance) and 100% (absolutely certain), how confident
are you in the accuracy of your answer to this question?
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